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Virtue Ethics, Politics, and the Function 













ABSTRACT: Can virtue ethics say anything worthwhile about laws? What would a
virtue-ethical account of good laws look like? I argue that a plausible answer to that













 gives us a philosophical argument to the effect
that laws are just only if they enable citizens to flourish. I then argue that the result-
ing virtue-ethical account of just laws is not viciously paternalistic. Finally, I refute
the objection that the virtue-ethical account I am proposing is not distinct from a
consequentialist account. 
RÉSUMÉ : Peut-on construire une théorie de la loi à partir de l’éthique de la vertu?
Qu’est ce qu’une bonne loi?Je dis que l’on trouvera une réponse à la question dans












 apporte une défense philosophique
de l’argument que les lois sont bonne seulement si elles amènent les citoyens a la vertu.
Dans §3, je montre que cette théorie des lois selon la vertu n’est pas outre mesure
paternaliste. Dans la dernière section, je réponds a l’objection suivante : que la théo-








The past twenty years or so have witnessed the growth of  a dialogue
between ancient philosophers and philosophers writing on central con-
temporary issues in moral or political philosophy. This has been particu-
larly true in the case of  the renewed interest in character and virtue as
ethical concepts, which has meant that many moral philosophers, such as
Annas (2005a, 2005b), Anscombe (1997), Hursthouse (1999), and Slote
(1995), have gone back to the philosopher they perceived as the founding
father or their creed: Aristotle. Other scholars, notably Martha Nuss-
baum, seemed to believe that their philosophical perception could only be
enhanced by their knowledge of  ancient texts, be they from Aristotle,





On the whole, and rather surprisingly, Plato’s contribution to the cre-




This is perhaps due to a focus on the part of readers on Plato’s strong com-
mitment to the thesis of the unity of the virtues, and on the somewhat








 Nonetheless, if  we look at other
dialogues, we may see that Plato does have very useful ideas to contribute
to the discipline of virtue ethics, in particular with respect to more recent
developments, a virtue-ethical approach to politics and the law. For this
reason, I shall try here to shift the focus, not only from Aristotle to Plato,









shall offer exegetical analysis of  this dialogue only insofar as it proves to
be useful for understanding Plato’s contribution to the debate on virtue
and the laws. 




 Roger Crisp and Michael Slote
note that there is a yet-to-be-filled gap in contemporary virtue ethics: “If
virtue ethics cannot produce some plausible conception of  social justice
and of  political morality more generally, then its main contemporary
rivals, consequentialism and Kantianism, will have a distinct advantage”




This article suggests how an advocate of  virtue ethics might respond
to this challenge by focusing on one central question that must be
addressed by a virtue theory, namely, what is it for a law to be a good law?





a dialogue often wrongly thought of  as mildly interesting from a histor-
ical point of  view but of  little real philosophical interest—rather boring.









 Plato argues that laws are good insofar as they promote vir-
tue in the city, just as parents are good parents, from the point of  view of
virtue ethics, if  they encourage virtue in their children. As I hope to show,
this response to the problem is a deep one, from which we can learn a
great deal.
 




This Platonic argument is closely relevant to modern debate in virtue
politics, not just as a pointer for future debate regarding the justice of  laws,
but as a defence of  existing claims such as that from Martha Nussbaum:
 
The idea is that once we identify a group of  especially important functions in
human life, we are then in a position to ask what social and political institutions
are doing about them. Are they giving people what they need in order to be
capable of  functioning in all these human ways? Are they making it possible for
citizens to function well? (1992, p. 214)
 
Nussbaum derives this conclusion from Aristotelian essentialism: Aristo-
tle’s conception of  human nature is in many ways more fully worked out
and more psychologically intuitive than Plato’s theory of  the tripartite





Yet, the most promising argument needed to link claims about human





in Aristotle’s works. If  we want to argue not only that Aristotelian essen-
tialism enables us to appraise laws in terms of  their success at enabling
flourishing, but that this is indeed the right and proper measure of  success
for a law, then we must turn to Plato.
This article is structured as follows: §2 argues that a plausible answer
to the question “What would a virtue ethical account of  good laws look









. In §3, I show why two alternative virtue-ethical accounts of  good




 and one offered by Michael





us a credible philosophical argument to the effect that laws are good only
if  they enable citizens to flourish. In §5, I argue that the resulting virtue-
ethical account of good laws is not overly paternalistic. 
 
2. Virtue Ethics, the Law, and the Parent Analogy
 
Virtue ethics is distinct from consequentialist and deontological ethical
theories in that it attaches praise or blame not primarily to actions or




 Thus it is difficult for a virtue
ethicist to derive moral rules from the theory: just because x’s character is




This makes it awkward for the virtue ethicist to say anything sensible
about laws. As Slote has noted, “because virtue ethics is supposed to con-
centrate more on the inner life of  the individual than either consequential-
ism or deontology, one can easily wonder whether the former is really
capable of  doing justice to law or to any sort of  objective or real constraint
upon human action” (1995, p. 91).
This passage seems to express not one, but two, distinct worries. First,










 to be the courageous/
just/temperate/wise course of  action in a given set of  circumstances is the
courageous/just/temperate/wise thing to do. So laws are redundant: the
virtuous agent has no need to be guided by them. What the virtuous agent
will do is always guided by an understanding of the particulars of  the sit-
uation in which one is required to act. It follows that the less than fully vir-
tuous agent, who does not always know what the right thing to do is,
cannot be guided by the laws either, as by their very nature laws fail to take
particular circumstances into account. 
The second obstacle to saying something about laws in a virtue-ethics
theory is this: what could a virtue ethicist’s account of  a good law be? A
consequentialist would answer that a good law maximizes happiness, and
a deontologist might say that it treated everyone as an end in themselves,
but no such extension of  the theory seems available to the virtue ethicist.
An agent is good if  she has a good character, i.e., if  she is psychically
healthy, or has achieved harmony amongst the different sources of  her
motivation. It seems that it would be difficult to transfer this account to
laws without an unacceptable degree of  anthropomorphism, that is, treat-





I argue that the way out of  the virtue ethicist’s difficulties in dealing with














 can help us answer the question “What is it for a law to be good?”




 in isolation, the crucial role of  the parent anal-
ogy might go unnoticed. If, however, one reads it together with the Laws








Thus, I want to


















Plato presents an argument for the conclusion that
Socrates owes the (personified) Laws of  Athens obedience even when they
command that he should die. The Laws, Socrates claims, have been as a
parent to him in that they have provided for his nurture and education: 
 
Since you have been born and brought up and educated, can you deny, in the
first place, that you were our child and servant, both you and your ancestors?
And if  this is so, do you imagine that what is right for us is equally right for







A coherent interpretation of the argument summed up in this passage sug-
gests that the duty to obey is not grounded in respect or gratitude that a
child owes a parent, but in the child’s natural duty to obey. But what can




 53e ask Socrates to
 




consider what will happen to him and his children should he take them to
exile into Thessaly, the home of “indiscipline and laxity,” and the Laws
comment that their lives would be like one long banquet and moreover they
would be the object of laughter and ridicule. Would they not have a better
chance of becoming good citizens if  they remained in Athens among
Socrates’ friends, to be brought up according to the same laws as their
father? A city that does not have strong or good laws is not a good place
for bringing up children, the Laws suggest. Obedience answers the child’s
need to become habituated in order to develop a virtuous character. A par-
ent who does not require the child to obey consistently may not provide the
child with what he or she needs to become virtuous. Habituation requires
repetition, and repetition requires external influence in the form of parental
authority. For example, a child will not share her toys of her own accord,
yet she will not become a successful person unless she learns to share. So it
is in her interest to obey her parents’ commands to let other children play
with her favourite toys until she is able to appreciate for herself  that sharing
has its good points and that not sharing leads to not having any friends. 
Similarly, the reason a virtue ethicist might give for obeying the law (and




presents for consideration) is
that the laws guarantee the conditions necessary for flourishing in the city.
In other words, it provides the framework or environment for an agent to





 53e that Socrates would be unwilling to have his children
brought up in Thessaly: such a city would not provide the framework
required for them to become virtuous adults. It follows that when there is
a legal framework that is conducive to virtue, to disobey the law is to harm
one’s own potential for flourishing. It is also to harm another’s potential for
flourishing because it endangers the framework necessary for all to flourish.




 illustrates how external constraints can
be relevant to achieving virtue without requiring justification by appeal to
objective, universal moral laws. First, it is clear that good laws in a virtue-
theoretical sense do not correspond to some ideal blueprint. It is not open
to a virtue ethicist to write a treatise in which she will list all possible good
laws. Which laws are actually good needs to be worked out within the soci-
ety to which they apply, i.e., taking into consideration what is needed to
achieve flourishing in that society, and what threats there are likely to be.




Second, the parent analogy shows that laws derive their authority from
need: they enable our flourishing. What parents say goes, not because they
represent a universal law which they are passing on to the child for use in
adult life, but because they are training the child, habituating her, and the
best way to inculcate good habits into someone is to rule by laws. 
Any argument that the law is to the citizen as the parent is to the child is






claim that something is good or bad for you even if  you do not know it is,
and there is an intent to force that something upon you. More straightfor-
wardly, the worry is that by appealing to the parent analogy to explain the
relationship between laws and citizens, we end up implying that laws should
treat citizens as if  they were children who do not know what is good for
them and who have to have decisions made on their behalf. If  this is what





no place in answering philosophical questions about the role and place of
laws because it is not the case that most people would accept (or have good
reasons to accept) an idea of themselves as children unable to decide for
themselves what constitutes the good or virtuous life, or enable them to lead
it. Although some people might be unable to do so in practice (because
their life is not conducive to reflection), and some people might be unwill-
ing to do it, most people would claim, rightly, that they are in principle
capable of making decisions that contribute to the good life. Hence, a philo-
sophical account of laws that relied on paternalism would be unacceptable.




 to answer the question “What is it for a law to be a good law?”
from a virtue-ethics perspective. This question is distinct from, but as




 addresses, i.e., “Why should




 seems to suggest, it is at
least conceivable that we would have good reason to obey a law that is not
good because to disobey it would, for example, undermine the authority





50ab). Thus, an answer to the question “Why should we obey?”
does not necessarily give us an answer to the question “What makes a law




 has to say about what makes a law
a good law is crucial to the project of  virtue politics. 
 




I consider here whether there is a virtue-ethical account of  what it is for a










and another is Michael Slote’s writings on virtue ethics. I will show that
neither of  these sources gives us a satisfactory account of  good laws. 
The first, most obvious place to look for a virtue-ethical account of a




, where Plato talks at great length
of what it is for a state to be a good state, based on his definition of what it




 is, by turns, on the
soul and the organization of the form of the ideal state. Although in the lat-
ter capacity it describes at length the political organization of the city and
the rationale for distributing political responsibility, it does not really say
much about laws. It is therefore not a source which we can obviously con-








, which are specifically about laws.
 




Moreover, we cannot simply say that a good law is a law passed by a good
state, as it is not clear either that any law passed by a just state must be just,
nor that an unjust state cannot pass just laws. There is nothing unjust about
the French law which proclaims a certain day in May as Mother’s Day, even
though that law was passed by the Vichy government. On the other hand,
the British law stipulating that London cabs must carry a bail of  hay at all
times is unjust despite having been passed by a government which was not
obviously unjust. The point is that laws have to be assessed in the socio-
political context in which they are applied, and this may be very different
from the socio-political context in which they were created. So, while a
good legislator may be a good judge of his or her society’s needs at a given
time, he or she cannot guarantee that the law will remain just at all times.
This is why we need to be able to say more about what makes a law a just




 cannot provide us with an account. 













 also features a parent analogy as part of  an
argument for the conclusion that the legislator’s main task is to promote
wisdom, i.e., make sure that citizens are in a position to choose for them-




 687d-e), something I discuss more fully




, Plato seems to suggest that laws would have no
room in an ideal state, because perfect statesmen should be flexible in their
rule, and treat each case according to its merit (294a, 300c). This sugges-
tion is highly interesting because it takes seriously the incompatibility
between virtue ethics and the rule of  law. But the dialogue twists and Plato
goes on to argue that in the absence of  the true king, what we must do is
obey existing laws without ever questioning or changing them. I have




 is another of
Plato’s attempt to reconcile laws with virtue. On close inspection, it seems
that what Plato is doing in that dialogue is defending the rule of  laws, when
it works hand in hand with equity. In other words, we should accept to be
ruled by laws even if  we know it is impossible to achieve a set of  perfect
laws, but at the same time we ought to be able to respond to particular
cases in the way the true king does. 








 would no doubt add








, and to a virtue-













with their explicitly and extensively developed use of  the parent analogy,
remain the most straightforward Platonic sources for beginning our inves-
tigation into the possibility of  a virtue-ethical account of  good laws.
In his discussion of the punishment of war crimes, Michael Slote argues






Thus national legislators who pass a law may do so for many different possible
reasons, but we might want to say that if  they do so out of  a desire for the public
good, or the good of  their country, then the law they pass is justly enacted and
is a just law; whereas, if  they act from greed or narrow sectarianism, then they
don’t act justly and the law they pass is tainted with that injustice. (2001, p. 79)
 
At first sight, Slote’s argument looks a bit dubious: good intentions do not
necessarily make good laws. At the very least the lawmaker has to be vir-
tuous, i.e., in a position to judge what effects a law will have on citizens so
that the good intention can be realized in practice. 
But even with the above amendment, the account remains unsatisfac-
tory. Slote is using the premise that in virtue ethics an action is praisewor-
thy if  it is performed by a virtuous agent; in other words, actions derive
their value from the state of  the character of  their performer. As passing a
law is an action, it derives value from the character of  whoever passes it,
i.e., the lawmaker. However, Slote fails to note that a law is distinct from
the act of  passing a law, and thus a lawmaker may act justly in passing a
law, and, at the same time, that law may be unjust. This is clearest if  we con-
sider that laws age and that a law passed by a just lawmaker may come to
be quite rightly regarded as unjust, simply because the circumstances in
which it is applied have changed, or our perceptions of  them have evolved.
Once again we can cite the example of  the taxi and bail of  hay. It may have
been a wise move at the time the law was passed to ensure the working
horses of  London were well fed, but, clearly, the lawmakers did not envis-
age that the law would soon be redundant because taxis would no longer
be horse-driven. Equally clearly, it was not a failure of  wisdom on their
part they did not envisage this: the prediction of  scientific innovations and
their social and moral implications is not part of  being virtuous. 
Because it would not have been possible for the most virtuous of  law-
makers to foresee that the law would one day become unjust (for a law
which allows taxi drivers to be fined nowadays for not carrying a bail of
hay is unjust), then it cannot be a sufficient condition of  a law being just




 Once again, we can con-




 remains the best source for an
account of  what makes a law a good law.
 








 to the effect that a law





be divided into four parts. The first, 234a-236c, introduces an unusual
theme: Socrates, on the verge of  making a speech, claiming to be good at









ond part, 236d-239a4, describes the origins of  Athens and the Athenians.
Plato argues that the earth and the city of  Athens are the true parents of
 




the Athenians, from which it follows that all Athenians are brethren and
thus should have equal political status. The third part, 239a5-246a, gives
a curiously anachronistic and heavily revised history of  Athens. If  any
part of  the dialogue is meant to be taken as either parody or political com-
mentary then surely this is it. At least one commentator has read this pas-




The last part, 246b-249c, on the other hand, is the most obviously philo-
sophical part of  the dialogue. Socrates uses it to speak in the voice of  dead
soldiers passing on a message to surviving parents, children, and to the
state. Platonic themes such as the unity of  the virtues (246e) and justice as
temperance (248a-c) are prominent, and, as I will try to show, there is an
important philosophical argument in this passage. 





think that it is of  a political nature rather than philosophical. In particular,
both Huby (1957) and Kahn (1963) read the dialogue as a political pam-
phlet, one meant to shame the current Athenian government into chang-
ing some of  its recent policies. They support their views with plausible
historical analysis of  the dialogue and I do not wish to argue against them.
Nonetheless, I believe that the dialogue also contains a self-standing













50c-51c, is an argument by analogy, and it draws a conclusion about what
it is for a law to be a good law from a premise about what it is for a parent
to be a good parent. The conclusion of  the argument is that the measure
of  a good legal system is its success at producing virtuous citizens. This
conclusion is presented both implicitly and explicitly in the dialogue. It is
explicit at the end of  the second part of  the dialogue, where Socrates links
virtuous men and good governments: “For government is the nurture of
men, and the government of  good men is good, and of  bad men is bad.
And I must show that our ancestors were trained under a good govern-




At this point in the dia-
logue, the conclusion is not wholly supported, but the analogy is under
way: Socrates has already argued that Athens is a mother to the Athenians
and that a mother’s function is to nourish and nurture. He proceeds to
make it clear that the nurturing of  citizens consists in making them virtu-
ous, stating that the city will be responsible for turning war orphans into
virtuous citizens:
 
While they are children she [the city] is a parent to them, and when they have
arrived at man’s estate she sends them to their several duties, in full armor clad;
and bringing freshly to their minds the ways of  their fathers, she places in their






This is an implicit statement of  the conclusion: if  the laws of  Athens are
good, this is what they should do, i.e., care for the virtuous growth of  cit-




 is that the
laws are not doing this as they should, and therefore are no longer good. 
To sum up, the argument Plato uses in order to support the conclusion
that a good law is one which nurtures virtue starts off  with premises about
what it is to be a good parent. As for the conclusion, the premises can be
found (explicitly) in the second and (implicitly) in the fourth parts of  the
dialogue. In the second part of  the dialogue, Plato makes the offensive
claim that a mother who does not feed her infant is no mother at all (237e).
This is not, however, a random misogynistic comment, but an unfortu-
nately worded claim about the function of parenthood leading to the con-
clusion that the measure of a good parent is his/her ability to bring up
children who are successful human beings, i.e., healthy and virtuous. (Pre-
sumably, prior to the existence of powdered milk, and absenting a wet
nurse, a mother who was unable or unwilling to feed her baby would not
have had much success at keeping it alive). A second premise is implicit in




 (discourse of the dead) where
Plato claims that the best reward for parents is not to be grieved upon their
death by their children, but that their children honour them by living as
well, i.e., as virtuously, as they can (247a). Grief  should not be excessive
and efforts at virtue must be increased in order to properly honour one’s
dead fathers. This implies that a successful parent is one whose children are
virtuous and so supports the conclusion we got from 237e.
Hence Plato’s parenting analogy: a successful parent is to virtuous chil-
dren as a good legal system is to the virtuous citizen of  a city. The dialogue
is rife with references to the analogy, most notably at 237b: “And the coun-
try which brought them up is not like other countries, a stepmother to her
children, but their own true mother; she bore them and nourished them
and received them, and in her bosom they now repose.” This passage gives
us the core of  the analogy. Family relationships are rooted in nature and
need: the mother is by nature best suited to provide for the infant. In the
same way, the land by nature provides food for its inhabitants (237e-238a)
and gods to educate them, and enables them to grow strong enough so that
they may govern themselves (238b-c). Thereafter the land and the city
jointly provide for and nurture the citizens of  Athens: the city educates
them (238c) whilst the land carries on her task of  feeding them and receives





which the Personified Laws of  Athens point out to Socrates that they have
held a function both similar to, and higher than, that of  parents by
enabling his progenitors to marry and start a family, and by providing for
his education. In both dialogues, the City is presented as natural, that is,
something that can be viewed and judged in terms of  the functions it ful-
fills.
 




This reading of  the analogy may be challenged. When Plato talks of  the
city being as a parent to the children of  the diseased soldiers, he may be
appealing to a different argument altogether: the soldiers lost their lives for
the city, and as a result their children are orphans. The city is therefore
obliged to replace, or even serve as, the lost parents as well as it can. More
strongly put, an agreement is hinted at between the city and the soldiers it
sends to war: the soldiers risk their lives on the understanding that the city
will look after their children if  they die. But this argument is not by itself
sufficient to show that the city can be as a parent to the war orphans: it has
to be the case that it is capable of  being parent-like. I may promise a friend
that if  he dies I will look after his business. But if  I do not have a good head
for business, I will not be able to fulfill my promise. In the same way, if  the




 to the children of  the dead, then it must be in
some way parent-like, i.e., it must be capable of  fulfilling the function of
parenthood. This will clearly be the case if  the city is as a parent to citizens
anyway: when the soldiers die, it is only required to be more particular in





Together with the passage at 238a-c, and, in particu-
lar, Plato’s claim that “government is the nature of  men,” following the
analogy of  the land and a mother, it is clear that Plato intends for us to see
the city as a parent of  citizens, one who is able to carry on the work started
by the land (feeding and educating sufficiently so that we may feed our-
selves and create a city for ourselves) by educating citizens to virtue.
 
5. Why the Virtue-Politics Account Is Not Overly Paternalistic
 
There are several things we might mean by paternalism, and various objec-
tions we might hold against it. Here I will concentrate on one particular
kind of  paternalism which seems to come with a virtue-ethical theory of
laws, a kind which presents a threat to our ability to choose for ourselves
the best life we can. The anti-paternalistic position virtue ethicists would
be up against can be outlined as follows. Parents make choices for children
because children are not capable of  choosing the best for themselves as
they are not yet fully rational. But once they reach what is commonly
agreed to be the age of  rational maturity, or adulthood, their parents are




 In the same way, laws cannot rule





they have to respect what Joseph Raz refers to as people’s ability to “shape
their life and determine its course” and to be “creators of  their own moral
world” (1986, p. 154).
Of course these abilities are already seriously limited by various uncon-
trollable aspects of  our culture and environment. Being born in a certain
part of  the world, into a certain social class, to a particular religion and at
a particular time, and being born a male or female all affect the choices we






vidual to question her moral beliefs and to decide for herself  whether she
wants to renew her allegiance to them, then that law is threatening her
autonomy in a way that her cultural background is not. In the modern
world it is plausible that a cultural background should be partially rejected





 but to reject a law is to become a criminal, to put oneself  in a
position where society has a right to exact revenge and impose its concep-




 A good liberal can hold that the shackles of  tradition
are meant to be shaken or broken—not so those of  the law.
The idea that there should be virtue-promoting laws is especially open
to the kind of  anti-paternalist objection I have described. If  laws promote
virtues, then there seems to be a very clear sense in which they do not allow
individuals to create their own moral world. For example, they would not
encourage an individual to flourish as a controlled intemperate, someone
who allowed himself  to drink, eat, and take drugs to excess, even were
there nobody around who might be harmed by his behaviour. This person
would have been taught, at an early age, that intemperance was a vice, and
that moral worth was not to be measured by the consequences of  one’s
actions, but by the state of  the agent’s character. So, more generally speak-
ing, people could not choose to shape their lives according to consequen-
tialist or deontological theories. People who lived under virtue-promoting
laws would not be the “creators of  their moral world.”
But of  course the virtue-promoting laws need not be coercive: they do
not put people in jail for behaving in ways that encourage the development





an intemperate manner (if  no one else was harmed) need not be a crime,
and the person who chose to live in that manner would not be punished.
But my point is not that somebody’s attempt to live according to different
values would be thwarted by the laws, but that nobody would even think
of challenging the moral world in which they were born. This is not equiv-
alent to saying that people are shaped by their cultural, social, and family
background, and is therefore not open to the reply that people are often
challenging the values they were given as children. If  moral education
were directed by the state, then the usual pathways through which one
comes to challenge one’s values would be closed: one would simply not be
able to discuss different value systems and different moral theories with
people who had been brought up differently. The uniformity of  moral for-
mation would make it much harder for people to choose their own moral
way of  thinking.
Having stated the objection as strongly as possible, I will now endeavour
to show that a virtue ethicist who takes her cue from Plato’s parent analogy
can successfully reply to it. Legislating on the principle that the good life
is the virtuous life endangers people’s autonomy. It is nonetheless true that
autonomy requires the capacity to choose, that is, being informed about
 




what choices are available, being able to reflect on the short- and long-term
consequences they are likely to have, and on whether our several choices
are compatible with each other. It follows that one virtue—wisdom—may
be promoted without endangering autonomy: on the contrary, promoting
wisdom is tantamount to helping people become more autonomous. If  the
virtue ethicist can limit her claim to the idea that laws should be wisdom-




In order to show that the virtue ethicist can do just that, I turn once





Book III, 687d-e, the Athenian describes a father’s attitude to his child’s
dreams as one of  fear and worry that they should come true. This passage
is suggestive. The twenty-first-century parent often shudders at his child’s
ambitions, whether it be to become a soldier or a princess—equally fright-
ening prospects. The parent does not necessarily see her role as removing
these ambitions and replacing them with suitable ones. Nor does she
encourage them or just wait and see whether they come to be realized and





this: that his child may acquire enough wisdom so that he may, come the
time, make the best choices. Parental intervention thus takes the form of
teacher of  wisdom. In true Plato style, this example is then used as an anal-
ogy for the law/citizen relationship:
 
I, for my part, urged that this is an injunction to legislate with a view to one
single virtue out of  four. He should keep them all in his view, I said, and in the
first place that virtue which brings all the rest in its train, that is, judgement,
intelligence, and right conviction attended by appropriate passionate desire.
(Laws III, 688a)
The Laws’ proposal deflects paternalism without losing any ground for vir-
tue ethics. Either Plato is right that the good life is the virtuous life or he
is wrong. If  he is wrong then the effect of  wisdom-promoting laws will not
be to impose the virtuous life as the best life, but merely to put people in a
position to choose for themselves which life is the best life (as long as it is
not harmful to others). So people will be able to “create their own moral
worlds” and live according to consequentialist, deontological, or other
moral norms.
If  Plato is right when he says that the virtuous life is the best life, then
wisdom-promoting laws will ensure that individuals flourish without
endangering their autonomy. This is true whether or not we accept the
unity of  virtue thesis. If  we do, then we believe that a wise person will nec-
essarily be courageous, temperate, and just. But if  we do not we may still
claim that someone who is wise will realize for herself  that she needs virtue
to flourish and, helped by her wisdom, will seek the virtues. Either way,
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the wisdom-promoting laws do not impose on the subject a conception of
the good, but rather help her seek and achieve her own. 
The claim that laws should be wisdom-promoting gives us a minimalist
kind of  paternalism. The laws do not make it their business to teach all
citizens to be virtuous. On the assumption that wise people will know
what is best for them and make the right choices, the laws only need to
ensure that wisdom prevails. This leaves the law with two main tasks: to
educate the young into wisdom, and to preserve a peaceful, stable, and
prosperous environment in which wisdom may be sustained. This covers
laws on education and laws which prevent harm to others, but it is not
obvious that this virtue-ethicist account will warrant other laws: it will be
expected that citizens who have been properly educated will on the whole
know how to make the right choices. If  the system fails them and they
make choices that threaten others, then they are faced with the laws
designed to protect the environment, and these laws will therefore act as a
deterrent or, failing this, as protection. Thus the account I have described,
according to which the function of  laws is to promote wisdom in the com-
munity, gives us a very minimalist legal system—one even Mill might find
acceptable.
Of course, this is still paternalism of some kind, as the law’s role is not
value-free, and laws do impose some conception of the good upon citizens.
At the same time, it must be very difficult to claim convincingly that one
has no need to be wise, and that it is nobody’s business but ours if  we do
not choose wisdom for our children. In other words, if  the argument in the
Laws suggests paternalism, it is not the kind of paternalism which we ought
to reject. If  we combine this reading of the Laws with the argument in the
Menexenus, then we are left with a parent analogy which is not viciously
paternalistic on account of imposing a conception of the good on citizens
which leaves them no room for personal choice. The parent analogy, I con-
clude, cannot be rejected on grounds that it is unduly paternalistic.
6. Conclusion: Plato and Modern Virtue Politics
In the introduction I stated that virtue ethics cannot appeal to external
constraints derived from universal objective laws. This could mean that
the future of  virtue politics is very limited, i.e., that it cannot explore one
important avenue in political philosophy—the justice of  laws and political
obligation. Plato, in the Menexenus, shows how we might sidestep this dif-
ficulty and give an account of  what it is for a law to be just by appealing
to the parent analogy. Just as a successful parent is one whose children
grow to be virtuous, a successful legal system is one which promotes wis-
dom in the city, thereby ensuring that citizens are able to pursue virtue and
flourish. In both cases we have a measure of  success that is firmly
grounded in considerations of  citizens’ characters.
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By putting forward and defending the conclusion that the measure of
good laws is their success at producing wise or virtuous citizens, Plato
offers a plausible solution to the problem posed at the beginning of  this
article, namely, whether virtue ethics can say anything about what makes
a law a good law, and thus whether it can compete with Kantianism and
utilitarianism in the political domain. However, my answer to the chal-
lenge is open to the following objection. Is there anything that is specific
to virtue ethics in the solution offered here or could it be achieved equally,
and more easily, through a consequentialist argument? 
The reply to this objection can only be to bite the bullet, so to speak.
However, the bullet is a soft one. True, a consequentialist with a deep con-
cept of  happiness24 and a commitment to virtue theory25 could come up
with a very similar account of  just laws, one which made the same points,
and even relied on the same analogy and the same texts. But this does not
mean that the virtue-ethical account is redundant and should be aban-
doned. On the contrary, if  a virtue-ethical account can inform accounts
from rival theories, then its richness ought to be celebrated and we should
seek to develop it further.26
Notes
1  For example, Nussbaum’s discussions of  cosmopolitanism are inspired by the
writings of  Marcus Aurelius and Cicero, and she draws her version of  the
capability approach from Aristotle’s theory of  human nature. See her 1996,
1997a, 1997b, 2000, and 2003.
2 See Michael Slote (1999); Julia Annas (2005b), whose discussion of  the con-
cept of  wickedness is based on a reading of  Books 8 and 9 of  the Republic; and
Christine Korsgaard (1999), who bases her discussion of  self-constitution on
Plato.
3 This is perhaps why Philippa Foot, in her pioneering book Virtues and Vices
(1978), claimed that she found Plato less useful than Aristotle when talking
about the virtues.
4 Crisp and Slote noted that at the time they were writing, progress was already
being made in that area. Progress continues nowadays, with Nussbaum and
Slote being the leading writers in the field of  virtue politics. It is interesting to
note that by the time Virtue Ethics was published, Nussbaum had already
written one influential article on virtue politics, “Human Functioning and
Social Justice: In Defence of  Aristotelian Essentialism” (1992).
5 For more on this, see Slote 1995, p. 92. 
6 However, see Rosalind Hursthouse (1996) on why virtue ethics can accommo-
date some moral laws.
7 At a push we might apply the theory to the city, as Plato does in the Republic,
i.e., that a just city is one in which the parts are working together in harmony.
As a city is made up of  people, the anthropomorphism is less worrying. 
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8 Sara Monoson, who mentions the Laws’ speech in the course of  her discussion
of  the Menexenus (1998, n.46), sees that the parent analogy (or the family-
relationship model, as she refers to it) plays an important part in the dialogue,
particularly regarding the argument for the autochthony and equality of  the
Athenians and the bond that exists between citizens and city, a bond that leads
some citizens to lay down their lives willingly for the city on the understanding
that the city in return will care for their surviving family: “The Menexenus
thus suggests that Athenian norms of  family obligation can best guide one in
understanding how to maintain honourable, reciprocal relations between the
city and citizens” (p. 504.) Monoson contrasts the family model to the lover
model favoured by Pericles in Thucydides’ s Funeral Oration, and argues that
Plato is consciously opposing the Periclean model.
However, although Monoson advises that we compare the family model in
the Menexenus to that suggested in the Crito, she does not draw any significant
philosophical conclusions from the use of  that model in either dialogue. I
believe that if  we take her advice seriously and use the Crito to understand the
Menexenus, we can achieve a much deeper and more interesting understand-
ing of  the latter.
9 All references from the dialogues are taken from Plato 1989. Note that I argue
that the use of  the parent analogy in Plato’s Crito answers the question “Why
do we owe the laws obedience?” in Berges 2004.
10 It may seem that the idea that there can be no blueprint for laws is in contra-
diction with Plato’s view in the Republic that the Form of  the Good is the blue-
print for everything that is good, including the city. However, the Form of  the
Good need not specify what each thing that is good has to be like in detail,
but only that it should fit in the overall picture. Plato himself  avoids specifying
that there be too many laws when he describes the ideal city; he merely states
that there should be laws regarding this or that.
11 In §5 I shall argue that the parent analogy as it is used by Plato is not viciously
paternalistic in that its emphasis is on the flourishing of  children and citizens
rather than on expectations of  obedience. 
12 Here one may object that Slote’s argument is best understood as a method-
ological point than one about sufficient conditions. The best way to ensure
that just laws are passed is to have just lawmakers. Close reading, I think, does
not bear this out as Slote’s claim is phrased in such a manner as to suggest he
is looking for sufficient conditions: “if  the law is passed justly . . . then it is a
just law” (2001, p. 79). If, however, Slote is making a methodological claim,
then his point is question-begging as far as the present inquiry is concerned
(although this is not to say that it is a question-begging point taken in its own
context, i.e., the treatment of  war criminals) because it does not tell us what
makes a law a just law independently of  our appraisal or the lawmaker’s char-
acter; it tells us merely that just lawmakers make just laws.
13 The fact that Socrates claims he is merely repeating a speech written by Pericles’
mistress may also be contrasted with his denunciation of recitation in the Ion.
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However, as in the last lines of the Menexenus it becomes clear that the speech
is very probably Socrates’ own, the contrast is not necessarily significant.
Also introduced are grounds for thinking that the speech to follow is going
to be to some extent a parody of  Pericles’ funeral oration as reported by
Thucydides. For textual and historical support for the parody view, see Huby
1957, Kahn 1963, and Monoson 1998. All three recognize that there is some
amount of  parody in the dialogue directed at Pericles and Thucydides, but, at
the same time, they do not share A. E. Taylor’s view (1960) that the whole dia-
logue must be read ironically. All seem to agree that at least the last part of
the dialogue is meant to be taken as a serious piece of  philosophy.
14 Pamela Huby (1957) read this as a political pamphlet designed to shame Athens for
her recently created policy of seeking to cut back state support for war orphans.
15 That there should be such an argument is compatible with the view that the
dialogue criticizes Athenian policies, especially if  Plato thought that those
policies no longer supported the virtuous life in Athens. In particular, the
strong injunction at 248d-249a, namely, that the city should care for the chil-
dren of  the dead as parents would, thereby giving them the means to become
virtuous citizens, can be read both as a reminder of  Athens’ duty toward the
children of  the dead (especially topical if  Athens was then in the process of
revising the relevant laws) and as part of  an argument designed to elucidate
what it is for a law to be a just law.
16 See Huby (1957, pp. 107ff.) for the historical note regarding the proposed
reforms. 
17 Monoson suggests a different role for the analogy of motherhood and land, namely,
that it is used by Plato to support the conclusion that all Athenians are related
(1998, p. 500). While this is a plausible interpretation, it seems that it does not pre-
clude a role for the mother/land analogy in determining the city/parent analogy.
18 Here I follow Locke: “Their parents have a sort of  rule and jurisdiction over
them when they come into the world, and for some time after, but it is but a
temporary one. The bonds of  this subjection are like the swaddling clothes
they are wrapped up in and supported by in the weakness of  their infancy; age
and reason, as they grow up, loosen them, till at length they drop quite off  and
leave a man at his own free disposal” (1952, p. 55).
19 This position is supposed to be reminiscent of  Mill’s “harm to others” prin-
ciple (cf. 1991, p. 14) to the effect that the only purpose for which power can
be rightfully exercised over any member of  a civilized community, against his
will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is
not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear
because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier,
because in the opinions of  others, to do so would be wise or even right. One
way of  supporting Mill’s position (though not Mill’s own) would be to apply
Locke’s view: parents have dominion over children’s choices just because chil-
dren are not fully rational. So, given a mature adult, there are no reasons why
anyone should dictate to her what is best for her.
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Another argument is available for this particular anti-paternalistic position:
to impose life choices on individuals over and above their expressed prefer-
ences is wrong because we have no real way of  knowing what is good for peo-
ple beyond what they claim to prefer (see Hamlin 1993, pp. 653-54).
20 I do not want to underestimate how significant a threat to autonomy censure
might be; my point is that it is distinct from the threat of  laws.
21 The contrast is less obvious if  we consider non-coercive forms of  paternalism
of the kind defended by Chan (2000), i.e., where the laws encourage certain
choices without coercion by rewarding those who make them. However, such
laws are also more difficult to challenge than one’s own culture. Imagine, for
instance, being a smoker in a part of  the world where cigarettes are very expen-
sive, there exist important tax breaks for non-smokers, and schools teach peo-
ple to demonize smokers: if  you choose to continue to smoke, you feel as
though you have to stand up against a culture that is state-sanctioned, if  not
state-created. This makes it doubly hard to challenge it. 
22 One crude objection to the claim that laws should be virtue-promoting is that
people would be rounded up for not leading virtuous lives. Not so!—virtue-
promoting laws would have to educate the character, and, as Aristotle has
shown, this is best done through repetition, and then conscious and willing
habituation; spending time in prison does not achieve that. More insidious,
perhaps, is the objection that virtue-promoting laws would licence the jailing
of  people on grounds that they were bad examples for other citizens. But this
would have the same effect of  forcing people to behave in a certain way
because they were afraid of  being punished. Again, this effort at pretence
would probably prevent their character from maturing as it should.
23 One could also make a case for the other virtues. Arguably, courage is needed
for autonomy: one needs to be courageous to stick to the choices one believes
to be the right ones. Temperance may also be necessary if  one is to weigh the
pros and cons of  a lifestyle or course of  actions without being swayed by temp-
tation of  short-term enjoyment. And of  course, one could argue that no choice
is the right one unless it is just, and that all we need in order to make the right
choices is to be able to avoid injustice. 
24 See, for example, Griffin 1986.
25 A commitment to virtue theory does not entail a commitment to virtue ethics;
one may take the virtues seriously without thinking that they must be the cen-
tral ethical concept (i.e., before consequences or duties). See Driver (1996) for
a virtue theory that is not a virtue ethics.
26 I follow Rosalind Hursthouse, who in her On Virtue Ethics takes this view of
rival theories sharing conclusions and arguments: “And if  they [utilitarians and
deontologists] were to agree, and their only protest was ‘but we can say that
too—that’s a utilitarian (or deontological) thesis,’ I should not be inclined to
argue at all; I should be delighted. Let us by all means stop caring about how
we distinguish ourselves and welcome our agreements” (1999, p. 7).
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